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“Development: and the Roman Catholic
Claims grounded upon it.”

A PAPER

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BY THE REV. E. S. TALBOT,

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“Development: and the Roman Catholic
Claims grounded upon it.”

THE theory of development, urged by a Roman Catholic, has a defensive purpose. It is meant to bar a *primâ facie* case against the Roman Church. The charge against her, which is the easiest to make and to understand, is that Christianity in her hands is different from the Christianity of the Apostles and the early Church; that she has added to it, altered and modified it, both in doctrine as in the case of indulgences, in worship as in the case of the exaggerated homage paid to the Blessed Virgin Mary, in discipline as in the case of the enforced celibacy of the Clergy. Such charges are *primâ facie* valid; and to destroy this *primâ facie* objection is the aim of a Roman champion. The theory of development promises to do both this and more. It takes a bold line. It aims at converting these stumbling-blocks into evidences. It aims at showing that such alterations and additions are the natural signs of a healthy Church. And thus it seeks to get over to its own side the great advantage of a *primâ facie* case.

And it aims at doing this by the appeal to a principle or law of general application. We may state it simply perhaps in the form “growth is the law of life.” Any living thing has a power of change, increase, adaptation: remaining the same, it yet incorporates new matter into itself, and developes

new forms. It is obvious what a multitude of analogies from the phenomena of physical life, vegetable and animal, are suggested by the reference to this large principle *à propos* of the case of Christianity: or, coming to yet nearer parallels, how the case of Christianity would be illustrated by comparison with the growth, involving both change and enlargement, of political communities, and of such orders and societies as live long enough to come under the principle. But in particular the analogy is urged of an intellectual idea, a philosophical doctrine (as it is called) or system. Such ideas, if they live at all, are peculiarly governed by this law of growth and change. They mould themselves afresh in each generation under the influence of circumstances. Now Christianity, it is said, came into the world as an idea, and can be no exception to this rule. 'To compare it with itself in time past,' it is urged, 'is to apply an unreasonable test; and in fact a directly misleading one. If Christianity were the same as it was long ago, this could only be by its having petrified. As a fact it is not the same: witness your attack upon what you call Roman corruptions or innovations, and this very fact is the best proof of its life.'

It is plain then how important a matter this one of development is, that it raises the whole question of the character of Christianity as a Revelation. And we have to consider such questions as these:—

Is Christianity a developing religion at all in the sense just suggested? Is it not rather one unchanging, eternal?

Or, If we say that Christianity was intended to develop, but deny the rightness of Roman development, what grounds have we for doing this last, and what kind of development do we acknowledge?

Or to put the same thing in another way.

We may begin at either end.

We may deny development, and assert that Christianity is one and unchanging, the final and complete revelation.

Or we may admit development, and say that Roman development is wrong.

You will say this is contradictory: it cannot be optional, however convenient controversially, to admit or deny development: it must be either true or false. I reply that the contradiction is one of words; that Christianity *is* in one sense, and *is not* in another, subject to development: and therefore it is at our option whether we use the *word* development in the Roman sense, in which case we shall reject it; or use it in our own sense, in which case we shall tell the Roman Catholic that he misuses it.

Now of these two methods I think that the latter is the most adequate and satisfactory; but that the former brings out most clearly a great truth, which is really the most vital matter in the whole discussion.

I. Let us begin then with the former, saying, 'We cannot accept the theory of development.' Why? Now, first, it is well worth while to point out that the theory is new in the Roman Church itself, and for the evidence of this we refer to the standard authority of the Council of Trent. The method of the Council of Trent was to trace back to our Lord and the Apostles the whole 'veritas et disciplina' which it put forward. Thus in detail, speaking of confession to a Priest, it asserts that "*Universa Ecclesia semper intellexit omnibus post Baptismum lapsis jure divino necessariam existere;*" and again, it declares that "*ab ipso Ecclesiæ initio,*" there were all the Orders, and inferior Orders such as acolytes, which there now

are in the Roman Church^a. We may be surprised at the boldness of some of these claims made by the Council: we may think the development theory easier to maintain than this: but still there it is: and we must observe, first, that within the Roman Church there are two ways, distinct and irreconcilable with one another, of defending those points to which we object; secondly, that the one which is authorized is the one which seems hardest to us and most plainly contradictory to history; and that the use of the theory of development is the sign that Roman Catholics feel the difficulty themselves of accepting the view which nevertheless is the authoritative view of their Church, and are casting about for a better.

Now this has a temporary and immediate importance in regard to that which troubles some of us, the claim of Rome to possess perfect unity and certainty. For here are two diverse theories on a cardinal point. If one is an accredited teaching and the other an individual hypothesis, then there is disunion in the Rome of to-day; or if the accredited doctrine has changed, then the Rome of to-day is not in harmony with the Rome of Trent.

But this reference to the doctrine of Trent has another bearing of a less controversial kind, upon which I prefer to dwell. We may think that the Council of Trent was very bold in the claim which it made, that the whole Roman system of the time had come down from the Apostles, and was of universal unchanging authority. But by the fact of making this claim under these obvious difficulties, did not the Roman Church as represented by the Council give her most weighty testimony to that principle with which we have now to do; the principle of the

^a Conc. Trident. Sess. xiv. cap. v.; Sess. xxiii. cap. ii.

unchanging character of the Christian Faith and Church, of their catholicity in time, as I may venture to call it; the principle which is the same as that expressed by the famous saying, 'Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus'; the principle which is the very foundation and pillar of the Church of England, as we understand it, and as her authoritative formularies represent it, and to which, whether Rome exchanges it for a new doctrine of development or not, we must remain faithful?

And this brings us to the main point, Why, in the sense that we do reject development, do we reject it? Why do we maintain the unchanging character of the Christian Faith?

Now those great words, "Jesus Christ the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever^b," evidently do not decide the matter: they do not exclude development: in a sense they imply it: for is not He, the Unchanging One, also the Infinite? and would He not have us know Him more and more, and pierce deeper and deeper into His Infinity? and is not this development after its own sort? But yet these words do raise up an image of massive and stately stability, of something entirely adequate and sufficing. And in their context this is heightened both by what comes before, "Remember them which have the rule over you, who have spoken unto you the Word of God, whose faith follow, considering the end of their conversation;" and by what comes after, "Be not carried about with divers and strange doctrines."

And I suppose we may say, that the fact of the Incarnation is the fact which makes us hesitate about development. Take, for example, the argument from the analogy of the Old Covenant. Through the

^b Hebrews xiii. 8.

history of that Covenant (we are reminded) there was development; and the Jewish faith and religion of our Lord's time was very different from that of Moses. But then at once it occurs to us to answer that the Gospel stands to the Old Covenant as the full sunlight to the gradually brightening dawn, and recall such words as, "God, who in sundry parts and in divers manners spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in the end of these days spoken unto us"—not in one part or in one manner, but fully and many-sidedly—"by His Son^c." S. John in like manner says, "The darkness passeth, and the true light now shineth^d." "The Light is come into the world^e." Similarly, the age of the Gospel is described as "the last days^f." And, to speak generally, the New Testament writers speak as of living in an age of illumination, except when a contrast is drawn with a future state not in, but beyond, this world: "Now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face. Now I know in part^g."

We have, then, to notice how this view passes on into the early Church and becomes an axiomatic principle. That the faith was traditional from the beginning; that Christian loyalty consisted in maintaining what Apostles had delivered; that Apostolic sees were especially authoritative, because the tradition which they handed on had a special guarantee of authenticity; that new doctrine was a thing to be abhorred; these, I believe, were theological common-places of the early Church.

^c Heb. i. 1. lit. 'at the end of these days.' ἐπ' ἐσχάτου τῶν ἡμερῶν τούτων. There is much that needs investigation in this and like passages. They do not clash with true development, possibly they even point to it, (e. g. "The darkness *passeth*.") But at least they seem to justify an impression of the finality of the Gospel, as compared with all that preceded it.

^d 1 John ii. 8.

^e John iii. 19.

^f Acts ii. 17.

^g 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

What then are the difficulties in accepting this view?
I mention two.

The first is one which would perhaps not trouble any one here, implying as it would the want of elementary theological knowledge. May I put it as simply as possible by saying, that it would be grounded on the fact that there is development between the Gospels and the Epistles, and that the religious teaching of the Epistles is in this sense an altogether different thing from that of the Gospels? But we have only to consider what we mean by the Revelation of Jesus Christ; that (1) it consisted of His whole Manifestation of Himself, His Person, His Words and Deeds, ending with His Death, Exaltation, and (what is sometimes overlooked) Gift of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost as the fruit of His Incarnation, which last are integral parts of the Gospel; and that (2) until it is thus complete, its manifestation may be said not to begin,—that manifestation or witness, first in the hearts of the Apostles, then through and with them to the world, being especially the function of the Blessed Spirit given at Pentecost.

The truth then of which we say that it is unchanging, Catholic, sufficient, is not that of our Lord's parables and teaching when as yet the very subject-matter of the Gospel was non-existent, and when the Holy Spirit not being yet given there were many things which He had to say to them which they could not then bear; but it is as the Church has called it, the "*Fides Apostolica*," the faith of Pentecost, the whole Manifestation of Jesus Christ at once completed in, and interpreted by, the Holy Spirit given to the Church.

A development then from the Gospels to the Epistles is not a difficulty.

But it has been very seriously urged, that between the Epistles (or New Testament) and the Creed of Nicæa, with its formulated, or, as borrowing the word in question, we might say, its developed doctrine of the Trinity, there is a long development.

Now this is a very important part of the matter. It is all-important that we should know what relation the Nicene Faith bears to the Faith of the Apostles: and I suppose we shall be glad if we find that the account which *the Nicene Fathers would themselves unquestionably have given* is the true one; namely, that it is one and the same truth, expressed more elaborately, guarded on this side and on that against misinterpretation and attack, but absolutely the same and unchanged, as little added to as diminished from. But into this part of the subject I cannot enter now. It deserves to be treated separately, and I hope that Mr. — will tell us something about it. To consider it thoroughly, it would be required to examine single passages, in which individual Ante-Nicene Fathers seem to use language in some sense negative of full Nicene doctrine. These must be examined in context with the whole works of the writer. This great work has been done by Bishop Bull in the *Defensio Fidei Nicænæ*, for which, by the bye, he received the thanks of the Gallican branch of the Roman Church. I must express my regret at my own want of acquaintance with it. But to express briefly what seems to me the truth, looking at the matter superficially from the outside, I think that the so-called development between the Apostolic times and those of Nicæa is of this kind. It is as though a man who held a conviction broadly, clearly, unassailably in his own mind, were after a while catechized about it: “Do you mean this?” “do you

mean that?" "how do you reconcile this then with the other?" "may I infer then this from what you hold?" "do you agree then with so and so, who has used words very like yours?" and as though to each of these questions, some of which would have occurred to him before, some of which would be new, he were to answer yes or no; and then at the end, out of these assents and dissents systematically put together, there were drawn up an explicit and formulated statement of his views. The faith of the Apostolic Church seems to me to correspond to the state of the man before he is subjected to the catechetical process, that of the Nicene Church to his state afterwards. There would be no addition, no change, no development; but only clearness and explicitness. And just as this supposed individual might easily make slips in the answers which he would give, from not perfectly understanding a question suddenly put to him, or from using language without perceiving that for some reason it would convey to others a different impression from that which he intended, or from not having realized some of the bearings of his conviction which yet afterwards he himself or even another person could correct by comparing the particular answer with the general tenour of the rest; so it may be that we are to explain the statements of Ante-Nicene Fathers which vary in form or substance from the Nicene exposition of the faith, to say nothing of the aberrations, intellectual or other, of individual minds, for which, in estimating the mind of a Church, you must allow.

Taking then some such view as this of the relation of the Nicene position to previous antiquity, let us turn to such points as the infallibility of the Pope, purgatory, and most of all the worship of the Blessed

Virgin Mary and the doctrines of her assumption and immaculate conception; and compare the two cases. Apply the same tests. Imagine the same kind of questions put to the Apostolic Christian; and could it possibly be said that you could elicit from him, merely by making him put his convictions into explicit form, an assertion of the Roman doctrines to which I have referred?

Thus then, for I cannot dwell longer upon this, we are, I think, justified in saying that we cannot accept Roman development because the Christian Faith is not a thing of change, but always one and always the same.

II. But this was only one of the positions which I submitted to you that we must take. It is clear, broad, effective, true; but it needs to be supplemented by the other, viz. by saying that there is a development of which Christianity admits, but that Roman development is not of that kind.

Now the developing quality in Christianity follows, I suppose, from its human side (as its unchangeableness follows from its divine side); from the likeness which, so far as it is a system or idea, its history must have to that of other systems or ideas; from the fact that it has had a historic course appointed for it by God, and that as it has pursued its way amid ever changing and ever new surroundings, and has had to face new needs and questions, it has been ever producing things new and old, and fresh light has been constantly cast on the 'old Truths ever new,' and fresh meanings drawn out of them.

This is true development; this is the glory of Christianity, proving it to be a living religion. And this is the theme and subject of the Christian historian, and of a Christian philosophy of history.

The question then now arises, Is Roman development the true outcome and expression of this charac-

teristic of Christianity? Is this the rôle which Roman development can claim to have played?

Now, in the first place, it certainly seems as though we had anticipated the answer to this question by our discussion of the parallel between the Nicene Creed and the results of Roman development. For if it be true that it is a development by method of addition, of new discovery, or of new revelation from the Holy Spirit to the Church; then it is *primâ facie* at least not such a development as that of which I was just speaking, and which consists in interpreting, explaining, realizing, in fuller distinctness the meaning of the same unchanging truths.

But waiving this, let us consider further. A development such as Christianity should have ought to have an affinity with the times in which it takes place, ought to produce that which meets their deeper needs, ought to sanctify the institutions and movements which are characteristic of each period, and also to provide the principles which correct their excesses. And it ought to do this in a way which we should feel to be Divine, because evidently not of human reasoning or framing, but operating by some inner secret of wisdom and power. I say this is what the development of Christianity should be, but we can illustrate by examples of what actually has been. See, for example, how in the ages when the establishment of strong authority was a prime condition of progress Christianity sanctified and strengthened the principle of authority by the religious character which she gave to the imperial and mediæval monarchies, while at the same time she tempered it by infusing that sense of responsibility which always accompanies the acceptance of authority as a Divine trust; and then, when authority ran into

excess, forgot itself, and distorted its religious sanction into proud theories of Divine right, how the Gospel provided the counteracting motive, revealed a democratic side, inspired the whole movement of modern liberty, and provided the principles which distinguish true freedom and equality from licence or from a coarse grasping for self on the part of each class and individual.

Surely this accommodation of itself to periods so utterly unlike as the mediæval and the modern is a most true development in the right sense; and surely the power by which Christianity meets the period of democracy is not the invention of something new, but simply this, that under pressure of the new demand, and in the light of new circumstances, a side of the New Testament teaching gives out fresh meaning, and speaks home to men with a new clearness which was before impossible.

The case of slavery is only a marked special instance of this development. In that excellent pamphlet, "Does the Bible sanction American Slavery?" the more valuable as coming from one who is not a professed theologian, Professor Goldwin Smith, we see what light Christianity has to throw on a great moral issue and crisis, such as that of the emancipation question. But while the teaching is truly found in Christianity, yet it is brought out of Christianity by a kind of *development*, inasmuch as it is only perceived completely when the time is in other ways ripe for the change.

Or, take a very different instance. The advance of science gives the physical world a much higher place in men's thoughts: it adds to the dignity of matter, and brings out the intimate connection between what is material and what is spiritual in human nature and life.

And immediately new meaning reveals itself in the doctrines of the Incarnation and of the Resurrection of the Body, and in the Sacramental system wherein through material means spiritual grace is given, and given not to souls only, but to body and soul together; we perceive new fitness in the Parables of our Lord, and the analogy which they assume between nature and what is supernatural. I say this new meaning reveals itself, this new fitness is perceived. It was there before. Men did not see it all, because they had not yet reached the other thoughts which were necessary to interpret all the meaning of the doctrine; just as the whole political and social meaning of the doctrines of Christian liberty, and of the dignity of every Christian, could not be perceived amid the servitude of the Roman empire.

These are true developments, developments due on the one hand to a light cast upon Christian truth by the unrolling providential order of the world, and on the other hand to the open eyes and earnest insight of faithful and prayerful Christian men watching the unrolling of that order, comparing it with revealed truth, and noting the light which they cast upon one another. Every faithful attempt to consider in a Christian manner new discoveries of natural truth, and to meet by Christian expedients new needs, movements, and emergencies in the life of humanity, is a contribution to this true development.

How much richer and larger these contributions would be if we had an undivided Church, a burning faith, an undoubting prayer, if so much of the higher intellect were not unconsecrated to God, He Himself only knows. But what weakness we see, and we see much, in this part of the Church's life, in its developing and originating capacity, is at least no additional

stumbling-block to those who guide themselves by the rule, that if "one member suffer all the members suffer with it^h," and who feel that a Church stained, divided, and burthened with infirmity as the Church Catholic now is, must needs shew the evidence of these defects in all parts of her life and action.

I urge therefore that we can see of what sort true development is, and that we need not be "offended" because the amount of it which we have is less, and therefore our conception of it more hazy than it should be. We see why, things being as they are with the Church, this must be so.

I lay great stress on this matter of true development. Our security against spurious forms of any idea is perception of its true form. And I am sure that to dwell on this true development will be our best safeguard against the pretentious, but really quite inadequate, or rather quite spurious, form which Roman Catholicism offers. Let me recommend emphatically, as books likely to help indirectly thought of this kind, two of the graceful little volumes of the present Dean of St. Paul's,—his Sermons before the University 1869, and his Three Lectures on the Influence of Christianity on National Character 1873. I should not grudge the time spent on this paper, if it had no other effect than to induce some of you to read these books.

And we have to remember that in this development we may have, any of us, our own part to play, since it consists in the constant adjustment to surroundings ever new and shifting of a Faith, a Life, and a Church, always one and unchanging, but living and therefore capable of continually new adjustment and combination. And these must take place through

^h 1 Cor. xii. 26.

the earthen vessels however mean, the human instruments however poor, in which at each time the Faith and Life and Church receive human embodiment.

Our true duty therefore is to bear our part with head and heart in this development, seizing whatever help is given to us by Christian workers, or even by great writers outside the Christian pale, whose thought bears impress of Christian influences and developes truths or examines problems by a light which at its source flows from Christianity.

It is but little that we shall be able to see, and little that we shall be able to do. But that little is what God requires of us; and as I have tried to shew you, we can understand very well how it must naturally be that it is little, done in a field so vast by an agency so imperfect.

But then (and this is the last of the considerations which I have to submit to you) Rome comes before us with very different language. As she professes to offer us a Church which is undivided, and a visible living authority which is infallible; so, it being once admitted that there is development in Christianity, it is essential to her to be able to claim that she has a perfect development, and she claims it.

It is part of one and the same great paradox, of the view morally and religiously so unscientific, that Christian faith and love and piety can be dull and weak, and by many deserted, as all, whether Roman Catholics or not, alike admit that they are, and yet that Christian unity and the clear shining of Christian truth in the world shall in no wise share the defect.

And so Rome offers her developments, and asks us to accept them as one proof the more that she is the true Church.

I can only suggest a few considerations about them for your reflection.

(1) Are they of the kind which we have seen to be true developments, adjustments to historical needs, instances of the new exhibition under new circumstances of the vital power of doctrines? Take the syllabus with its wholesale denunciations of modern science and civilisation, does this resemble the adjustment of Christianity to the Providential order of secular progress? Do we see that the worship and deification of the Blessed Virgin Mary, or purgatory, or transubstantiation, all of which Dr. Newman would reckon developments, possess at all that wonderful power, which resides in the Incarnation and the Passion, of being fitted to meet the needs and capture the devotion of the noblest hearts and heads of these later generations, while yet they are utterly above what could have been contrived for the purpose? Are they not on the contrary parts of a development which grows more and more aloof from, more and more contemptuously hostile towards, the best results of men's thinking and working in the world outside? But it may be said, in parts we do see the divine correspondence, which I have denied, between Roman developments and their surroundings. The development of the papacy helped to preserve Christianity and the Church in the chaos of early mediæval history: the belief in purgatory, Mr. Oxenham urges, makes the Roman Church much more able than we are to teach uncompromisingly a stern doctrine of rewards and punishments in the world to come. Neither example is, I think, satisfactory for its purpose. As to the papacy, a closer binding together of the Western Church under a patriarchal head in ages of disorder may well have been providentially intended,

without justifying any conclusion as to an infallible papacy driving many out of its communion or out of Christian faith as it did at the Reformation and ever since by its tenacious maintenance of corruptions and unlawful claims.

As to purgatory, it is not this that we need, but the early doctrine of an intermediate state, which from the unwarranted teaching of purgatory the Reformers in their reaction too much cast aside.

I say then Roman developments do not play the part which, if true, was to be expected of them. We have difficulties: they do not help us in them. We are met by many anxious questionings about the future state: Roman development does not help us to meet them. We want clearer teaching about the nature and limits of Inspiration: Roman development has no counsel for us there. We are beset by questions which science raises about the Bible history of man's origin, and about the existence of spirit or of anything beyond matter and its forces in the world; and we get no help from Roman development. At the most we get general denunciations of those who, although they are unfortunately alienated from Christianity, have yet a place and name of honour as honest and devoted explorers in the great library of God's works.

These, I say, are our great wants, and there is no sign of a true development in Rome to meet them. A true development would be like a "householder bringing forth things new and old": it would reveal new aspects of the old Christian truths unseen before, but when seen, carrying a conviction of their own truth to our hearts, wearing that special attribute of what is divine, viz. that till revealed we cannot find it, but when revealed it seems natural.

But if Roman development does not do this, what is it? Do we see, judging it fairly, signs of false development about it? Now mark what I mean by false development. I do not mean dishonest development, development wilfully wrong. But I mean this, a development which is human, while true development is divine: a development such as the reason of man, his logic, or some of his instincts, push him on to; whereas true doctrine, surprisingly as it meets man's nature, is yet above him, such as he would not have found or worked out. I mean a development which is artificial, the work of our own hands; whereas true development is the living work of the Spirit.

And please observe the great importance of asking this question about Roman development, because developments of this sort are always going on. There is no idea in the world but men who hold it are inclined to run it out too far, to forget the limits imposed upon it by other truths, to pass on from the known to the probable consequence, from the probable to the possible, and to treat them all as equally known. There is no institution in the world but the people who care for it tend to make too much of it, and to distort its claims. And Christianity, in the world though not of it, is liable to the influence of these tendencies. There is a probability of unwarranted and false human development. It is therefore only the plainest wisdom to interrogate sharply any developments, to see whether they can claim a higher character. Our attitude is this: 'we know there will be human developments; we are less sure that we shall have, that the Church deserves, those which are divine: if we have the divine, they will come speaking with the still small voice: and therefore, when develop-

ments offer themselves, it is not too strong to say that the probabilities are against them, and especially if they have the clear cut limited character which so often marks the handicraft of human inference.'

We have, then, here an all-important alternative of possibilities about Roman development: if it is not divine, then it is the work of just those agencies which, because they are so human, are always at work with most subtle and steady power to change true religion into mere human forms,—I mean our instincts and logic. You see what difficult questions this alternative gives us to decide.

There are tendencies of the human mind to which I have referred which are at work upon all religious systems to impair and disintegrate. The man who is to distinguish true from false developments must have taken time and opportunity to gain some adequate knowledge of these, both directly through knowledge of his own conscience and character, and indirectly in the historical instances of their working. Is not this one of the many reasons for urging that it cannot be God's will that the question of leaving the Church in which one has been brought up for another should be decided in a few days or weeks, or in truth at all by one who stands just at the outset, or in the midst, of the very years of life which do more than any others both to mature the judgment and to acquaint it with the materials from which its conclusions must be drawn? And such are the years of University education.

I cannot now of course do more than suggest in the briefest way the kind of features in Roman developments which seem to indicate for them a human origin.

In some of them it seems to me we have the work of a human logic taking a mystery, and with no

warrant but its own seeming consistency pressing it out to consequences. Is not this so with the doctrines about the Saints? We have the mystery of the Communion of Saints, in which the living and the dead alike and together "live unto Him"; and we can pray for them, and we can hope that they pray for us, though even this perhaps we cannot *know* of those who are said to "*sleep in Jesus*ⁱ." But then comes the work of inference. If the saints are alive in the invisible world, they must in Jesus Christ know what concerns us; and then again another step on, they must be able to receive communications from us; and then again one step more, it must be right that we should ask them, and spend some of the time which we can give to prayer in asking them to pray for us. And if you do not do this, then the Roman tells you, you do not believe the mystery of the communion of saints, from which it all *follows*. Yes, but why "*follows*"? not by revealed consequence, but by ingenious human inference.

So again with purgatory. We have the revealed doctrine of the intermediate state; we have strong probabilities, scriptural and rational, that souls need some purifying, perhaps some expiatory, process between earthly life and the heavenly. And out of these inferences Rome extracts a doctrine of purgatory; and then, again, it borrows other helps, and from the doctrine of purgatory it extracts indulgences and the rest.

Or, once more, with transubstantiation: is not this the work of philosophizing inference upon a great mystery? And other developments about the holy Eucharist, worship of the Sacrament reserved for that purpose, benediction by the host; what are these but

ⁱ 1 Thess. iv. 14.

plain developments? The mystery "This is my body," or Christ with us in the Eucharist, is turned into a logical premise, and inferences are drawn such as these, "This is not bread"; or, "We may use this Presence at all times and in all ways, as well outside as inside the celebration of the Sacrament. We may keep it by us to worship it, and to bless with it."

I need not multiply examples of this, such as all that relates to the blessed Virgin, where we have a process which is a continuous chain of inferences, ending for the present in the Immaculate Conception^k, though one knows not to what it may go on.

In all cases of this kind of logical development, it is noteworthy that they have an impressive power over the mind and imagination by their consistency, thoroughness, and the like. And in each case, if we resist the conclusion, we are met with the charge, 'you disbelieve, or practically disbelieve, the Mystery from which the inferences are drawn.'

This is the developing tendency which we have to watch on the side of the intellect. But this would be comparatively weak, if it did not find allies in our instincts and affections. The emotions have their logic: it is one of our noblest instruments, but, like the logic of the intellect, it has its fallacies. Take the position of relics, was it not evolved from the sacredness of the body of the regenerate man by a logic of the emotions, and then confirmed by a logic of the intellect? "The bodies of the saints partake in redemption, *therefore* we should treasure their bones, *therefore* we should expose them to the veneration of the faithful."

And then to weary you with one more influence

^k If indeed the 'Mois de Joseph' does not already point to further developments.

which leads to development. It is the organizing instinct in human nature. Do you not suppose that the Papacy itself, and the compulsory confession of the Lateran Council in the 13th century, and the enforced celibacy of the Clergy in the 11th; and the Inquisition, owed their acceptance and imposition in no slight degree to the fact that they seemed to do their work effectively; that they were trenchant methods which promised success; that people identified the defence of them with the defence of the objects which they were to serve,—such objects as the spiritual independence of the Church, or an unworldly devotion in the clergy, or reality in the religion of the lay people, or preservation of the faithful from temptations to their faith?

But I must not prolong this further. My object in these latter remarks has been to ask your attention to the large amount of instigation towards false development which human nature finds in itself; and then to the indications which suggest that Roman developments, or the most defined and prominent of them, are of this and not of a higher kind. I have left aside such corroborative evidence as may often be found in the character of the times and surroundings in and amid which these developments received much of their growth, and of the men to whom they owed it.

Let me end by summarizing the course which our thoughts have travelled.

Our first point was that the Roman theory of development ascribes development to the Christian religion in a sense, degree, and kind which would change the distinctive character of that religion, and in a way which is not only alien to the ancient view, but new even to the Roman Church herself¹.

¹ pp. 5—9.

And we saw that the Nicene Faith was not a development of Apostolic Christianity in any sense which would support this theory^m.

Our second point was to examine the development of which Christianity does admit, the process by which it lives and moves with the life and onward movement of the world. What Christian development, in this subordinate but important sense, should be, we to some extent know, partly *a priori* from the nature of Christian Truths, partly from Christian History, partly perhaps also from our present needs and longings which only such development can satisfyⁿ. And, taken broadly, Roman development does not appear to be of this kind^o.

But, on the other hand, (and this is our third and last point^p.) Roman development does appear to belong to another kind of development, which is not divine but human. I have pointed to some features in it which seem to indicate that this is so^q. And as we know that such pseudo-development is always at work upon all institutions and all beliefs, and know also that it is the result of the combined force of some of the strongest and most permanent human instincts, the indications which I have referred to make it at least terribly probable that this is the true explanation of that development which Roman writers ask us to accept as strong evidence for their Church, and that such development threatens Christianity with dangers of no ordinary kind.

^m pp. 10—12.

^o pp. 17—19.

^q pp. 21—24.

ⁿ pp. 12—17.

^p pp. 19—24.







